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Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
Piotr Krysta
,
Carmine Ventre
Theoretical Computer Science
571
, 2015, pp. 21-35
Utilitarian mechanism design for multiobjective optimization
Fabrizio Grandoni
,
Piotr Krysta
,
Stefan Leonardi
,
Carmine Ventre
SIAM Journal on Computing
43
(4), 2014, pp. 1263-1290
Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
Carmine Ventre
Theoretical Computer Science
518
, 2014, pp. 64-79
Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies
Leslie Ann Goldberg
,
Paul W. Goldberg
,
Piotr Krysta
,
Carmine Ventre
Theoretical Computer Science
476
, 2013, pp. 24-37
On Stackelberg pricing with computationally bounded customers
Patrick Briest
,
Luciano GualĂ
,
Martin Hoefer
,
Carmine Ventre
Networks
60
(1), 2012, pp. 31-44
On the approximation performance of Fictitious Play We study the performance of Fictitious Play, when used as a heuristic for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium of a two-player game. We exhibit a class of two-player games having payoffs in the range [0,1] that show that Fictitious Play fails to find a solution having an additive approximation guarantee significantly better than 1/2. Our construction shows that for
n\times n
games, in the worst case both players may perpetually have mixed strategies whose payoffs fall short of the best response by an additive quantity
1/2-O(1/n ^{1-\delta})
for arbitrarily small
\delta
. We also show an essentially matching upper bound of
1/2-O(1/n)
.in finite games
Paul W. Goldberg
,
Rahul Savani
,
Troels Bjerre Srensen
,
Carmine Ventre
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
6942
, 2011, pp. 93-105
Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
Piotr Krysta
,
Carmine Ventre
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
6347
, 2010, pp. 39-50
Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification
Alessandro Ferrante
,
Gennaro Parlato
,
Francesco Sorrentino
,
Carmine Ventre
Theoretical Computer Science
410
(8-10), 2009, pp. 886-899
Collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification yielding optimal solutions
Paolo Penna
,
Carmine Ventre
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
5193
, 2008, pp. 708-719
New constructions of mechanisms with verification
Vincenzo Auletta
,
Roberto De Prisco
,
Paolo Penna
,
Giuseppe Persiano
,
Carmine Ventre
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
4051
, 2006, pp. 596-607
The algorithmic structure of group strategyproof budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms
Paolo Penna
,
Carmine Ventre
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
3884
, 2006, pp. 337-348
More powerful and simpler cost-sharing methods (When cross-monotonicity is the wrong way)
Paolo Penna
,
Carmine Ventre
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
3351
, 2005, pp. 97-110